

The Muslim Minority Nationalities of China:
Toward Separatism or Assimilation?¹

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Introduction

Islam is the world's second largest monotheistic religion, and its adherents are known as Muslims. In 2008 the number of Muslims in the world was estimated to be 1.4 billion (up from 1.2 billion in 2000 [Barrett et al., 2001]). In 2008 the Muslims were second in size only to the 2.2 billion Christians, the world's largest monotheistic religion (Central Intelligence Agency, 2008). There is a major division among Muslims between Sunnis and Shi'ites, that dates back to a debate several decades after the death of Mohammad about who should have succeeded him as the spiritual leader. The Sunnis held that any able and righteous Muslim with majority support should be permitted to be the leader, and they cited Mohammad's companions' unanimous agreement about his successor to support this claim. In contrast, the Shi'ites argued that Mohammad's successors could only be the descendants of his daughter and son-in-law, Fatima and Ali (the 4th successor) (Nasr, 2006). The Sunnis today comprise about 85 percent of Muslims worldwide, and the Shi'ites less than 15 percent. The Shi'ites, however, are dominant in some countries, e.g., over 93 percent in Iran, 85 percent in Azerbaijan, 80 percent in Bahrain, and around 65 percent in Iraq. In a similar vein, Christians are comprised of many different groups, with Catholics in the majority, at about 55 percent worldwide (Barrett et al, 2001; Central Intelligence Agency, 2008).

Most Muslims, over 1 billion of them, live in countries where the majority of the population is Muslim. However, between 300 and 400 million Muslims live in countries where they are not the majority. One such country is China, where in 2008 we have estimated there to be just under 23 million Muslims. We discuss later how we arrived at

this figure. Some believe the number to be larger, and we also discuss problems with the alternate figures.

Given the current interest worldwide about the Muslim population and their national and international impacts, and given the large absolute number of Muslims in China, some wonder if Chinese Muslims could ever have the national and international impacts of Muslims elsewhere in the world. Will Chinese Muslims ever be expected to impact China and the East Asia region in the same manner as, say, Muslims have in other parts of the world? Given that most of China's Muslims are of Turkic ancestry and live in Northwest China, one also wonders whether these Muslims could ever unite with Muslims in the Muslim-dominated countries of Central and South Asia that neighbor or are near China; or will they remain separated. In this paper we entertain this question. First, however, we provide some background about Muslims worldwide, and then about them in China.

Muslims in the World and in China

We already noted that most Muslims reside in countries where they comprise the majority. In the year 2000, there were 47 such countries in the world, and they contained over one billion Muslims (Abbasi-Shivazi and Jones, 2001). Figure 1 is a map of the Islamic World. Most of the world's Muslims live in North Africa, the Middle East, Eastern Europe, Central and South Asia, and Indonesia. North and South America, with less than 3 million Muslims (Abbasi-Shivazi and Jones, 2001), are not shown on the map. Northwest China, where most of China's Muslims reside (Figure 1), is clearly a geographical part of the Islamic World. The map also distinguishes the Sunnis and

Shi'ites, with most of the Shi'ites shown to be residing in Iran, southern Iraq, and Azerbaijan.

Table 1 lists the ten countries of the world in 2008 with the largest Muslim populations. Indonesia has over 204 million Muslims, Pakistan 163 million, India 154 million, and Bangladesh 127 million. India is the only country among the top ten where Muslims are a minority. In Nigeria, Muslims comprise half the total population of the country. In China even though less than 2 percent of the country is Muslim, it is the country of the world with the fifteenth largest population of Muslims.

For a rough indication of how large the Muslim populations would be in 2030 in these large Muslim countries, we also report in Table 1 the projected 2030 population counts for these countries, and for China (U.S. Census Bureau, 2008), along with 2030 estimates of the number of Muslims. The 2030 Muslim data were obtained by multiplying the country's 2030 total population by its 2008 percentage Muslim. The four countries with the largest Muslim populations remain the same: Indonesia, Pakistan, India and Bangladesh. Nigeria moves up to 5th place, from 7th place, and the remaining countries are ranked in the same order as they were in 2008. China's estimated Muslim population was 22.8 million in 2008, and is estimated to grow to be over 31 million by 2030. (The projected number of China's Muslims in 2030, shown in Table 1, is based on Muslim group-specific projections, based on their 1990-2000 rates of growth – see our discussion below).

Of the Muslim countries bordering or near China, only Pakistan and India have truly large numbers. But since those in India are relatively dispersed around the country, it seems that issues pertaining to the ties of China's Muslims with those in Pakistan are

the more important. The other Muslim-dominated countries neighboring China have many fewer Muslims (esp. Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan), and in the case of Tajikistan, the Muslims there are Shi'ites, not Sunnis. The Chinese government is aware of these actual and potential relationships and ties between its Muslims and those in nearby and neighboring countries, as is evidenced by the existence since the late 1990s of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), a NATO-type organization comprised of the member states of China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan; Pakistan, Iran and India are SCO "observers." We discuss the SCO in more detail later. Let us turn attention now to Muslims in China.

In the China, the majority nationality group is the Han. According to data from China's 2000 census, the Han people in 2000 numbered over 1.1 billion (Table 2). By 2008 we estimate they have increased to over 1.2 billion. They comprise about 91.5 percent of China's population. The remaining 8.5 percent of China's population consists of 55 minority nationalities (*shaoshu minzu*), numbering over 105 million people in 2000, and almost 118 million in 2008.

Ten of China's minority nationalities are predominantly Muslim and comprise roughly one-fifth of all of China's minorities (Poston and Luo, 2004). Between 1990 and 2000, China's Muslims increased by 15.5 percent, compared to growth rates for China and for the Han people of 9.6 and 9.1 percent respectively. Although China's Muslims comprised only 1.6 percent of the country's population in 2000, and an estimated 1.7 percent in 2008, their absolute number is very large. There are more Muslims in China than there are in every other Middle Eastern Muslim nation, except Turkey, Iran and Egypt; and there are about the same number of Muslims in China as in Iraq. There are

more Muslims living in China than there are, for instance, in Malaysia, Yemen, Mali, Tunisia, or Somalia.

The two numerically largest Muslim nationality groups in China are the Hui (over 9.8 million people in 2000, and 10.9 million in 2008) and the Uygur (almost 8.4 million in 2000, and 9.5 million in 2008). They comprise 90 percent of all Chinese Muslims, and will be given the most attention in this paper. The remaining eight groups are the Kazak, Uzbek, Tajik, Tatar, Kirgiz, Salar, Dongxiang and Bonan, ranging in size, in 2008, from almost 1.4 million (the Kazak) to almost 5,000 (the Tatar) (see Table 2).

We show in this paper that in many ways, the Chinese Muslim groups defy demographic and sociological generalization. On most demographic and socioeconomic dimensions, they are more different from one another than similar. And even within the groups, particularly the Hui and Uygur – the two largest Muslim groups, there are vast differences. This is a finding also reached by Weeks (1988) in his analysis of China's Muslims using data from China's 1982 census.

In our paper we first discuss the history of Islam in China. Then we address some of the problems in counting the number of Muslims in China; there are no data available anywhere on the number of adherents of Islam in China. Researchers thus base their counts of Chinese Muslims on the number of persons self-identifying in the census as belonging to one of China's predominantly Muslim nationalities (Lipman, 1997; Poston and Shu, 1987; Weeks, 1988; Gladney, 2004). Later we describe each of the ten Chinese Muslim groups, paying most attention to the two largest groups, the Hui and the Uygur. We then compare and contrast the ten groups with one another, as well as with the Han majority, and with three other large Chinese minority nationalities, namely, Koreans,

Manchu, and Mongolians, on the basis of each group's relative standing with regard to several social and demographic characteristics. We also present data on the residential locations of the Muslim groups, and examine the degree to which they are spatially isolated, as well as residentially segregated from the Han majority. Except for the Hui, the other Muslim groups are spatially isolated and highly segregated residentially from the Han. We show in these discussions that the ten Muslim groups are far more different than similar. These patterns of differences and similarities have profound implications with regard to the impacts of China's Muslims worldwide, as well as the country's government policy towards Muslims.

Brief History of Islam in China

Muslims first came to China as traders to a few of the southeastern port cities, e.g., Guangzhou, in as early as the seventh and eighth centuries AD (Dillon, 1999: 111-112; Leslie, 1986). Islam was introduced on a larger scale via Arab traders traveling the Silk Road into northwestern China. Trade between China and West Asia increased tremendously during the Song Dynasty (960-1279). Indeed, there are biblical stories of Joseph, Abraham and Ishmael found in the Chinese literature of the Song that have clearly been taken from Muslim, and not from Jewish sources (Leslie, 1998: 10). The numbers of Muslims in China increased further during the Yuan Dynasty (1279-1368) when they began to be integrated into the society. This period when the Mongols ruled China was characterized by the largest influx of Muslims into China in the history of China. Muslim soldiers became an integral part of the Yuan armies. And it was also during this period that a Mongol prince in the conquered Tangut kingdom that spanned

Gansu, Ningxia and Sichuan, who was one of the grandsons of Khubilai Khan, namely, Ananda, converted to Islam, along with tens of thousands of his population (Leslie, 1998: 10).

But it is with the Ming Dynasty (1369-1644) that Muslims became fully integrated into Chinese society. It is during this period that the Muslims are referred to for the first time as “Chinese Muslims,” instead of as “Muslims in China.” (Lipman, 1997: 38-51; Leslie, 1998: 14). It is also during this period that Zheng He, a Muslim and a eunuch, was the chief Admiral of the Chinese navy. Starting in 1405 and continuing for 28 years, Zheng and his fleet visited 37 countries and transformed China into the superpower of its time. Indeed, one author has argued that Zheng and parts of the Chinese fleet landed in the Americas before Christopher Columbus (Menzies, 2003).

Leslie (1998: 15) has noted that “during the Ming, mosques were built all over China, and communities with Ahung (Mullah or Imam) leaders flourished. Muslims were able to win degrees ... and to become magistrates and education officials.” The Ming rulers encouraged the Muslims to integrate and assimilate into the society and to marry Chinese women. Islam was seen by the Chinese as “amenable and willing to accommodate to Confucianism” (Leslie, 1998: 14; Lipman, 1997: chapter 2).

In the early years of the Qing Dynasty (1644-1911) the political relationships between the Muslims and the Chinese were quite favorable. Although many Muslims were further assimilated, most of the more successful ones remained faithful to Islam. There were a series of uprisings between the Hui Muslims and the Han Chinese near the end of the eighteenth century, and again around fifty years later. “Attempts at secession in Gansu [in the Northwest] and in Yunnan [in the Southwest] were suppressed with

millions killed, Muslim and non-Muslim. Some Muslims supported the government, others the rebels ... Muslims were involved in most Chinese activities by this time, but they still had a special role as herdsman of cattle and sheep, and in transportation and importation” (Leslie, 1998: 19).

There was a renaissance of Islam with the establishment of Sun Yat-sen’s Republic of China in 1911. Indeed when the Qing were overthrown and the Republic of China established, the national flag represented the principle of the new republic of “five races under one union.” It had five horizontal stripes of different colors, each stripe representing one of China’s five prominent nationalities, Han, Muslims, Tibetans, Manchurians and Mongolians. This prominent representation of the Muslims was maintained when Mao Zedong and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) assumed control of China in 1949. China’s current red flag has one large gold star in the upper left quadrant, with four smaller ones to its right. One interpretation is that the large star represents the Han Chinese, and the four smaller ones the Muslims, Tibetans, Manchurians and Mongolians. The Muslims have come a long way in China since their first contacts with the Chinese in the southeastern port cities in the seventh and eighth centuries.

How Many Muslims Are in China?

There are no data available to answer the question of how many Muslims reside in China. As noted in this paper’s introduction, the 2000 Census of China enumerated 20.3 million persons who identified themselves as members of one or another of the ten predominantly Muslim minority nationality groups of China.

We estimate this number has increased to 22.8 million by 2008. We calculated the 2008 population estimate for each Muslim group (and for the Han and the other comparison groups) by first computing for each group the percent change in the population size of the group between 1990 and 2000, the two most recent dates for which we have real population data available. Lacking other population data for the groups, we used a geometric rate of change to produce an estimate of the size of the group in 2008. When no other data are available, “measures of population change based on the geometric growth rate are widely used” (Rowland, 2003: 61).

The Chinese government identifies and counts people according to their ethnic nationality, and not according to their religious affiliation. A reviewer of this paper made the observation, with which we agree, that official Chinese doctrine is highly uncomfortable with the notion of “religion,” although Islam is one of the five officially recognized faiths in China. However, the true number of Chinese Muslims is not known. Nevertheless, Gladney has observed, that 20.3 million is a very good estimate of the number of Chinese Muslims in 2000 because there are “few Han converts to Islam, and perhaps even fewer members of the ten [predominantly Muslim] nationalities ... who would dare to say they are not Muslim, at least in front of their parents” (Gladney, 2007: 94).

As noted previously, researchers studying Muslims in China agree that the ten Muslim minority nationalities (*minzu*) mentioned earlier comprise virtually all of China’s Muslims (Lipman, 1997; Poston and Shu, 1987; Weeks, 1988; Dillon, 1999; Israeli, 1980). There is very little intermarriage in China of Muslims with non-Muslims (i.e., with Han peoples or with members of any of the 45 non-Muslim minority nationalities).

Data from the 1990 census show that a mere 0.2 percent of the Uygurs intermarried outside their group, and most of those intermarrying Uygurs married persons from other Muslim groups in China (Chang, 2006). Intermarriage of Muslims usually involves a Muslim man marrying a non-Muslim woman, who then becomes a Muslim, a practice occurring as far back as during the Ming (Lipman, 1997: 45). In the past and today, the intermarriage of Muslims hardly ever involves a Muslim woman and a non-Muslim man. There are very strong community pressures, along with Muslim law, prohibiting the out-marriage of Muslim women (Chang, 2006: 67). All this suggests that few if any Muslim women are “lost” via intermarriage to non-Muslims. If there is a net change in the count of Muslims via intermarriage, the limited demographic research indicates it is a very small net gain.

Some argue that there should be many more than 22.8 million Muslims in China in 2008 because, for one reason, when Chiang Kai Shek’s Nationalist government (*Guomindang*) ruled China, the Chinese Muslims in 1936 were estimated to number in excess of 48 million (Ferm, 1976: 45). Thus one discussion we observed on the Internet stated that since China has “increased 3-4 fold” since 1936, “we can conclude that the total Muslim population” has grown by at least the same proportion, so that, therefore, the total Muslim population [in China] is [now] at least 150 million” (“Muslims in China,” 2008).

We hold that there are at least two problems with this deduction. First, there was no census enumeration undertaken in China in 1936, so that the empirical basis for the 48 million count of Muslims in 1936 is suspect. Second, in the 1930s, the *Guomindang* were attempting to solicit support from Muslims in the Middle East in their battles against the

Chinese Communist Party. It is likely therefore that for political purposes, they inflated their estimated count of Chinese Muslims. It is unlikely that the number of Muslims in China today exceeds 23 million persons.

The Ten Predominantly Muslim Nationality Groups in China

We noted earlier that there are ten predominantly Muslim nationality populations in China. We now highlight each of these groups, paying special attention to the largest groups, the Hui and the Uygur. We show that these groups are more different from one another than similar. But there is one important area in which they are quite similar. With the exception of the Tajik (see below), all the Chinese Muslim groups are predominantly Sunni.

Hui. In 2000, the Hui people numbered over 9.8 million people, and an estimated 10.9 million in 2008. They are the third largest of all the minority nationalities in China (the Zhuang and the Manchu are the two largest), and they are the largest Muslim group. Their projected population in 2030 is 14.6 million, and they will still be the largest of China's Muslim nationalities. The Hui reside in all of China's provinces and regions and in most of China's counties. Their geographical diversification rate (we discuss this index in more detail later) is by far the highest of all the Muslim groups (Table 3), and, for that matter, the highest of all of China's 55 minority populations. The distribution data in Table 4 show that the Hui are present in large numbers in all the provinces of China.

Owing of their wide distribution throughout China, it is difficult to generalize about the Hui. Indeed, Gladney refers to them as the "enigmatic Hui" in search of an ethnic group. He has visited Hui communities throughout China and reports that "the

more I traveled, the less I found that tied all these diverse [Hui] peoples together into one ethnic group” (Gladney, 2004: 53; see also Dillon, 1999: 2). On account of their extensive residential distribution around China, the Hui are the least isolated of all the Muslim groups. Regarding their degree of residential segregation from the Han (we also discuss this spatial issue in more detail later), the Hui are the least segregated from the Han of all the Muslim and non-Muslim minorities (Table 3).

The Hui may be distinguished from the other Muslim groups in China by virtue of the fact that unlike all the other Muslim groups in China, the Hui are Chinese people who practice Islam. A very popular surname among the Hui is “Ma,” after Mohammad. The Uyghur and most other Chinese Muslim groups, as we show below, are of Turkic ancestry, and those that are not Turkic, are of other non-Chinese ancestries. Also, although some Hui speak a few other languages in addition to Mandarin Chinese, they are “primarily Sinophone” (Lipman, 1997: xxii). It is thus not surprising that the Hui peoples are closer to the Han spatially and socially than any of the other Muslim groups. They have assimilated the Han culture more so than any of the other minorities. They wear Han-style clothing and indeed are often referred to as “Chinese-speaking Muslims” to “distinguish them from Uyghurs, Kazaks and other Muslim communities who are clearly not Chinese by virtue of their distinct cultures and languages” (Dillon, 1999: xvii). The Hui have relatively high levels of socioeconomic status compared with the other minorities (Poston and Shu, 1987; Ma, 1989). Their ancestors date back to the Islamic peoples from Middle Asia who migrated into China in the early periods of the 13th century. The Hui also include some Islamic Arabs and Persians who settled permanently

in the cities of Guangzhou, Hangzhou, Yangzhou and Chang'an (now Xi'an) in entrepreneurial activities, but these are in the minority among the Hui.

Uygur. Among China's 55 minority nationalities, the Uygur are the fifth largest minority group, and the second largest Muslim group, with a population in 2000 of almost 8.4 million, and almost 9.5 million in 2008 (Table 2). We project that they will number over 13 million in 2030, and will still be the second largest Muslim group in China. The language of the Uygur belongs to the Turkic group of the Altaic language family. The Uygur are mainly farmers, and their major products are wheat, rice, corn and cotton (Zhang and Zeng, 1993). Virtually all Uygur (over 99.3 percent) live in the Xinjiang region. They have an extremely low geographical diversification index value, one of the lowest of all the minority populations. Virtually all of them live in the Xinjiang area (Table 4).

Of the ten Chinese Muslim groups, the Uygur are the most visible politically. Indeed among the Uygur, there is a widespread separatist group known as the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM), which was declared a terrorist group by the U.S. State Department in 2002. Some U.S. and Chinese officials believe the ETIM has close ties with the Taliban and Osama bin Laden's Al-Qaeda terrorism network, although others are less sure about the closeness of these associations ("East Turkestan Islamic Movement," 2005). Both Pakistan and Afghanistan border Xinjiang, China, and some hold that Osama bin Laden has been hiding out since "9-11" not in Afghanistan or in Pakistan, but in China in or near Kashgar, the ancient city on the Silk Road ("Bin Laden in Muslim China," 2008; "Bin Laden is in China," 2008). Also, it is known that in the early 1990s "the Taliban regime in Kabul trained a number of militant Muslims [Uygurs]

from Xinjiang, whose aim was to eject China from Xinjiang and restore the independent state of East Turkistan” (Terrill, 2003: 234). Indeed there are (have been) reportedly up to twenty Uygur males interned under U.S. authorities at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba; these are Uygur who were apprehended during the U.S. intervention in Afghanistan in 2003 (Qassim, 2006).

The Uygur have also been linked to the 1989 Tiananmen demonstrations in Beijing in the person of Wu’er Kaixi, a prominent leader of the demonstrators. According to their language, Uygur signifies "unity" or "alliance" (Zhang and Zeng, 1993). However, despite the existence of extensive separatist activity among the Uygurs, most of them apparently do not seek their own Islamic state. Wu’er Kaixi has been quoted as stating that “we don’t ask for independence, but for respect, and an end to forced assimilation [with the Chinese Han]” (Schwartz, 2004).

Kazak. With a population of over 1.2 million in 2000 and almost 1.4 million in 2008, the Kazak are the third largest Muslim group in China (National Bureau of Statistics, 2001; also see Table 2). The Kazak people live mainly in Ili Kazak Autonomous Prefecture, and the Mori and Barkol Autonomous Counties in Xinjiang, as well as in Qinghai and Gansu Provinces. Their residential areas in Xinjiang border their ancestral country of Kazakhstan, although the ties with the “home” country are minimal. Their ancestors were the Wusun people, who, in the early 13th century, moved west with Genghis Khan. When Russia began invading Central Asia and taking over the Kazak grasslands, the Kazak migrated back to Chinese-controlled territory. They are different from the Hui and Uygur groups just discussed, with many living a nomadic life and only

a few settling down and working in agriculture. They are recognized for their expertise in horse-riding and wrestling (“Kazak Ethnic Minority,” 2008).

Dongxiang. The Dongxiang derive their name from the county where most of them live, namely, Dongxiang County in Gansu Province. In 2000, they had a population of over 513 thousand people and nearly 663 thousand in 2008, making them the fourth largest Muslim group in China (National Bureau of Statistics, 2001; Table 2). Unlike most of the Chinese Muslims, the Dongxiang language belongs to the Mongolian family; and they have no formal written language. The Dongxiang are strong believers of Islam, and their faith can be divided into Old, New, and Emerging sects which have largely influenced their people's life and customs. The Dongxiang are poor and socioeconomically and demographically disadvantaged (Poston, 1993, 1996).

Kirgiz. The Kirgiz minority numbered almost 161 thousand in 2000 and 178 thousand in 2008, making them the fifth largest of China's Muslim groups (National Bureau of Statistics, 2001; Table 2). Most of them live in the Kizilsu Kirgiz Autonomous Prefecture in the southwestern part of the Xinjiang Region, bordering the country of their ancestors, Kyrgyzstan. In the 7th century, under the Tang Dynasty, Kirgiz land was officially included as part of China's territories. The Kirgiz then began to communicate and interact with the Han Chinese. Their language belongs to the Turkic subdivision of the Altaic family of languages (“Kirgiz Ethnic Minority,” 2008).

Salar. The Salar are the sixth largest Muslim ethnic group. Over 80 percent of the Salar people live in Qinghai Province, with most of the others in Gansu and Xinjiang. In 2000 they numbered over 100 thousand, and 120 thousand in 2008 (Table 2). It is thought that the ancestors of the Salar came from Central Asia during the Yuan Dynasty (1271-

1368). The Salar share a language similar to the Uyghur and Uzbek, belonging to the Turkic branch of the Altaic language family. Today, most young and middle-aged Salar speak Mandarin Chinese. Their population is mainly engaged in agriculture, handicrafts and horticulture (“Salar Ethnic Minority,” 2008).

Tajik. The Tajik had a population in 2000 of just over 41 thousand, and over 48 thousand in 2008 (Table 2). More than 90 percent of them live on the so-called "roof of the world" in the Taxkorgan Tajik Autonomous County in southwestern Xinjiang, bordering their ancestral country, Tajikistan. Their origins may be traced to the Pamir tribes from around present-day eastern Iran. In the 11th century, these Central Asian peoples spoke Persian, believed in Islam, and were referred to by the nomadic Turkic tribes as "Tajik." Animal husbandry and farming are their major sustenance activities. They also have a higher percentage living in rural areas (90.8 percent) of any of the other Chinese Muslim groups except for the Dongxiang (95.7 percent) (Table 3). As noted earlier, the Tajik are the only of China's Muslim groups who may be classified as Shi'ite. They are Ismaili Shi'a (not Twelver, allied with Iran) who revere the Aga Khan (“Tajik Ethnic Minority,” 2008).

Bonan. The Bonan are one of China's smaller minority groups, with only 16 thousand people in 2000 and 21 thousand in 2008 (Table 2). Almost 92 percent of them reside in Gansu Province. Many of their legends, customs and language features derive from those of the Mongolians. Indeed, the Bonan language is descended from Mongolian. Owing to their increasing assimilation with the Han, most Bonan speak and write Mandarin Chinese as well as the Han people (“Bonan Ethnic Minority,” 2008).

Ozbek. The Ozbek minority group numbered just over 12,000 people in 2000 and less than 11 thousand in 2008; they are the only Muslim group in China to have declined in size between 1990 and 2000 (Table 2). They reside mainly in the far western part of the Xinjiang Region. Their ancestral homelands are in the country of Uzbekistan, whose eastern border is around 150 kilometers from the western border of the area where the Ozbek people now live in China. The name “Ozbek” may be traced to the Ozbek Khan, one of the local rulers during the Mongol Empire in the 14th century. During the Yuan Dynasty (1271-1368), Ozbek merchants began to travel along the Silk Road through Xinjiang to do business with the Chinese people. Many settled in cities in Xinjiang. Compared to most Muslim groups in Northwest China, most of the Ozbek people are city dwellers. Their rural population of just over 31 percent is the lowest of all the Chinese Muslim groups (Table 3). Like most of the other Chinese Muslim groups, the Ozbek language belongs to the Turkic branch of the Altaic language family (“Ozbek Ethnic Minority,” 2008).

Tatar. The Tatar are the smallest Chinese Muslim group, numbering just under 5,000 people in 2000 and in 2008 (Table 2). Most of them live in the Yining, Tacheng and Urumqi areas in the Xinjiang Region. Their history may be traced back to the Tang Dynasty (618-907), when the nomadic Turkic Khanate in Northern China ruled the Tatar tribe. When the Khanate’s power declined, that of the Tatars increased. Their homeland was then annexed by the Mongols when the Mongols migrated west. The language of the Tatars may be placed in the Turkic subgroup (“Tatar Ethnic Minority,” 2008). In 2000, almost 31 percent of the Tatar labor force was comprised of either government heads or professionals, a percentage higher than that of any of the other Chinese Muslim groups

(Table 3). Although their size is the smallest of all the Chinese Muslim groups, their socioeconomic status is the highest.

Socio-Demographic Characteristics and Differences

We now examine several socio-demographic characteristics of the ten Muslim groups. We have gathered socio-demographic data mainly from China's 2000 census (National Bureau of Statistics, 2001) and present them in Table 3 for the ten Muslim groups, for the Han, and for three of China's larger non-Muslim minority groups, the Koreans, the Manchu and the Mongolians. We have already noted the extreme variation of the Muslim groups on population size in 2008, ranging from almost eleven million for the Hui and over nine million for the Uygur to less than 5,000 for the Tatar. Two of the Muslim groups, the Hui and Uygur, account for nearly 90 percent of all Chinese Muslims. We have also mentioned briefly some of these socio-demographic characteristics; we now discuss them in greater detail.

With regard to fertility, all of the Muslim groups, except for the Tatar, have a total fertility rate that is higher than the 1.3 of the Han people, the fertility figure reported in the 2000 census. These could well be underestimates given the possibility that census counts may not completely represent levels of true fertility (Guo, 2000; Liang, 2003; Ren, 2005; Retherford et al., 2004). Tajik women, on average, reportedly have 2 children each, and Uygur, Kirgiz and Bonan women have 1.9 children each. One would expect the Muslim groups to have higher fertility than the Han if only because the Chinese government does not enforce the one-child policy as stringently among the minorities (Poston, 1993). However, it is interesting that the three comparison non-Muslim minority

groups shown in Table 3 all have fertility rates less than or equal to that of the Han; this is likely due to their generally higher socioeconomic status. With regard to fertility, the Muslim minorities look more like Muslim populations elsewhere in the world than they look like some of the other larger and historically important Chinese minorities (Poston and Shu, 1987; Poston, Chang, and Dan, 2006). Furthermore, owing mainly to their higher fertility rates, the Muslim groups and the other Chinese minority nationalities all grew at a higher rate between 1990 and 2000 than did the Han, i.e., over 15 percent versus just over 9 percent.

A small part of this increase in minority population change between 1990 and 2000 could be due to persons identifying as Han in 1990 but as minority in 2000. This phenomenon of minority reaffirmation, however, is much more prevalent among the non-Muslim nationalities than among the Muslim groups, and occurred at a much larger scale in China between 1982-1990 than between 1990-2000 (Poston, 1992, 1993).

The sex ratio at birth (SRB) in all populations should be in the range of 104 to 107, that is 104 to 107 boys should be born every year per 100 girls. This is a biological fact found virtually everywhere. This so-called biologically normal SRB of around 105 is likely an evolutionary adaptation to the fact that females have higher survival probabilities than males, and this is particularly the situation in modernized societies (Poston and Glover, 2005). The SRB data in Table 3 indicate that the Muslim groups vary considerably, from a ratio of 95 (Salar) to 150 (Tatar). This tremendous variability is due to several factors, such as differential underregistration of female births, female-specific abortion, and female infanticide (Poston and Glover, 2005; Poston and Morrison,

2005). The important point to note, however, is that the Muslim groups differ significantly on this behavior.

We look next at age and sex structure. Age and sex are arguably the most important of the many characteristics of human populations. In fact one demographer has stated that “it would not be exaggerating too much to say that changes in the age and sex structure affect virtually all social institutions” (Weeks, 2002: 294). Population pyramids may be used to examine this structural characteristic. In a pyramid, the ages start with zero at the base and climb to the old ages at the top. Females are pictured on the right, and males on the left. The age-sex data in population pyramids are usually graphed in 5-year intervals. In Figure 2, we show pyramids, from top to bottom, for the Hui, the Uygur, and the Han. The most important observation is that the pyramids show graphically that the Uygur are much younger than the Hui, who in turn are much younger than the Han. Overall the Uygur pyramid is quite different from that of the Hui, whose pyramid is different from that of the Han. The pyramids for some of the other Muslim groups (not shown in Figure 2) indicate even younger populations than the Uygur, and some picture older populations. These differences among the Muslim groups are all the more striking, especially given the broad impacts that age and sex have on all aspects of the society (Poston, 2005). If the age-sex structures are different, so then are many of the other features of the groups.

Another interesting issue dealing with age structure is age heaping, i.e., the extent to which populations report certain ages, say, those ending in 0 or in 5, at the expense of other ages. Age heaping is more pronounced among rural populations and those with low levels of education in which persons round their ages to the nearest 5 or 0 because they

typically do not know their true ages. A reviewer of this article observed that heaping is also representative of populations characterized by innumeracy, and by cultural integration, a point with which we agree. “The causes and patterns of age or digit preference vary from one culture to culture, but preference for ages ending in ‘0’ and in ‘5’ is quite widespread” (Shryock, Siegel, and Associates, 1976: 115).

In Table 3 we report Whipple’s Index values for all the groups. The Whipple’s Index ranges from 0 (when the digits 0 and 5 are not reported in the census data) to 100 (when there is no preference for 0 and 5 in the census data) to 500 (when only the digits 0 and 5 are reported in the census data). The Han report a value of 101.1, the Hui a value of 105.8, and the Uyгур a value of 166.5. There is virtually no age heaping on digits 0 and 5 among the Han, a little heaping among the Hui, and quite a bit among the Uyгур. The numbers of Uyгур counted in the 2000 census at ages ending in 0 and 5 overstate an unbiased population in which there is no age heaping on 0 and 5 by 66.5 percent (Poston, 2005; Shryock, Siegel, and Associates, 1976: 117).

The right panel of Figure 2 graphically shows the degree to which there is age heaping in the female populations of the Hui, the Uyгур and the Han. The age heaping at ages ending in 0 and 5 among the Uyгур is extensive. Some of the Muslim groups have a lot of age heaping, some have only a modest amount (see the Whipple’s index values in Table 3). This is but another example of a structural issue on which the Muslim groups differ significantly.

Occupation and education are two important dimensions of socioeconomic status. In Table 3 we present information for all the groups on two characteristics: the percentage of their workforce in professional and party leader positions; and the

percentage of the population age 6 and over who have completed one year of college or more. Less than eight percent of the Han are in professional and leadership jobs. Some of the Muslim groups have even lower percentages of workers in these high status jobs (the Uyгур, Dongxiang, Salar and Bonan), and other Muslim groups have higher percentages. Almost one-third of the Tatar labor force is in professional/leader jobs.

Similarly, the Muslim groups vary tremendously with regard to their percentages completing one or more year of college. Just over one percent of the Bonan and the Salar have some college completed, versus 11 percent for the Osbek and 14 percent for the Tatar. The Koreans, one of China's most socioeconomically advanced minority populations (Suh and Shultz, 1990; Poston and Shu, 1987; Poston, Chang, and Dan, 2006), have just under nine percent of their population completing some college. The Tatar and Osbek stand out remarkably with their high levels of college attainment, and the Bonan and the Salar with their very low levels.

About 20 percent of the Han people aged 15 years and over are not married. All the Chinese Muslim groups have higher nonmarital percentages, ranging from 18 percent for the Bonan to over 35 percent for the Kazak (Table 3). One reason why the Muslim groups have higher nonmarital percentages than the Han is because they are younger than the Han. But age differences of the Muslim groups alone do not fully explain the variability among them. Cultural and normative differences among the Muslim groups also play a role.

Most of China is rural. Over 63 percent of China and over 60 percent of the Han people live in rural areas. The Muslim groups vary tremendously on this characteristic, from a low of 32 percent of the Ozbek people living in rural areas to a high of almost 96

percent of the Dongxiang (Table 3). The two largest Muslim groups have rural percentages above and below that of China as a whole, namely, the Hui at 55 percent rural and the Uygur at 81 percent rural.

Another socio-demographic characteristic is the degree of distribution of a Muslim minority population across China's 31 major geographic areas; we refer to this as geographical differentiation (for more discussion of how the index represents the degree of spatial distribution of a group, see Gibbs and Poston, 1975). The index is calculated as follows:

$$\textbf{\textit{Geographical Differentiation Index}} = 1 - [\Sigma X^2 / (\Sigma X)^2],$$

where **X** is the number of persons of a specific Muslim group in each of China's 31 main geographical areas. The more even or balanced the distribution of the members of a group across the 31 areas, the higher the measure of geographical differentiation. The theoretical value of the index ranges from 0 (all members of a minority group are residing in one and only one Chinese province) to a value approaching 1.00 (members of the minority group are residing in every one of China's 31 areas and are equally distributed throughout each of these areas.)

Table 4 shows the calculation of the geographical differentiation index for the Hui and Uygur Muslim groups. The Hui have an extremely high index value, and the Uygur an extremely low value. Observe in Table 4 that the Uygur are almost exclusively located in the Xinjiang area. Over 99 percent of them live in Xinjiang, thus their very low value

of .013 on the geographical differentiation index. The Uygur are not at all geographically dispersed around China.

In contrast, the Hui peoples are considerably dispersed throughout China. They are not perfectly evenly distributed around China, but no one province contains anywhere near half or even a quarter of the Hui. The greatest concentration of Hui people is in the Ningxia Hui Autonomous Area, containing just under 19 percent of all Hui people. The extensive geographical distribution around China of the Hui is reflected in their geographical differentiation index value of .912.

The geographical differentiation index data in Table 3 show that all the other Muslim groups have markedly lower index values than the Hui, ranging from the highest of .292 (the Salar) to the lowest of .001 (the Kazak). The Hui with an index value of .912 are not only the most geographically dispersed of all the Muslim groups, they are the most geographically dispersed nationality group in all of China, except for the Han who have an index value of .951.

A final socio-demographic characteristic is the extent to which the minority group is residentially segregated from the Han people. We use the index of dissimilarity to compare the provincial level patterns of residence of each Muslim group from the Han majority. This is a commonly employed measure of residential segregation (Massey and Denton, 1988; Poston and Micklin, 1993; Fossett, 2005), and is calculated as follows:

$$\text{Residential Segregation Index} = 1/2 \left(\sum_{i=1}^{31} |M_i/M - H_i/H| \right)$$

where M_i is the number of persons of a specific Muslim group living in **province_i**, H_i is the number of Han persons living in **province_i**, M is the total number of persons of a specific Muslim group in China, and H is the total number of Han persons in China. The absolute differences between M_i/M and H_i/H are summed over all 31 provinces (also see Poston and Micklin, 1993). When multiplied by 100, the residential segregation index value for a Muslim group represents the percentage of persons in the Muslim group who would have to move to certain other provinces for their percentage distribution across China's 31 provinces to be the same as the percentage distribution of the Han. The higher the value of the index, the greater the degree of residential segregation of the Muslim group from the Han.

The last data column of Table 3 reports residential segregation index values for each of the Muslim groups. These scores reflect the extent to which the provincial-level patterns of residential distribution differ between the Muslim group and the Han. The Hui have a score of 52.7, which may be interpreted as follows: for the Hui and the Han in the year 2000 to have exactly the same percentage residential distributions across China's 31 provinces, almost 53 percent of the Hui people would have to move to certain other provinces than the ones in which they are presently living. The Hui are the least residentially segregated from the Han of all the minority nationalities, not only the Muslim groups, a finding that has also been reported using data from earlier censuses of China (Poston and Shu, 1987; Poston and Micklin, 1993).

The other Muslim groups report extremely high levels of residential segregation from the Han, all at 90 percent or higher. Over 98 percent of the Uygur people, the Kazak people, and the Kirgiz people would have to move to certain other provinces for there to

be no residential segregation between them and the Han. Segregation scores of 90 percent or higher are astoundingly high. These data indicate that in China, the Muslims as a whole, except for the Hui, live in certain places, and the Han live in other places. These levels of Muslim versus Han residential segregation in China are much higher than most of the residential segregation scores reported in Western countries for minority race/ethnic groups versus the majority (Fossett, 2005).

Implications

A major finding of this paper is the consistent demonstration that on virtually all dimensions of socio-demographic structure, the Muslim groups of China are far more different from one another than they are similar. In 2008 China has an estimated Muslim population of 22.8 million. There are more Muslims in China than there are in every other Middle Eastern Muslim nation, except for Turkey, Iran and Egypt; and the number of Muslims in China is about the same as in Iraq. Most of China's Muslims are Sunni Muslims of Turkic ancestry and live in Norwest China. One wonders whether these Muslims could ever unite with Muslims in the Muslim-dominated countries of Central and South Asia that are China's neighbors and exert an international impact in the region and the world. China's very large absolute number of Chinese Muslims leads one to ask if Chinese Muslims would ever have the national and international impacts and influences of Muslims elsewhere. Would Chinese Muslims be able to impact China, the East Asia region, and the world as have Muslims elsewhere impacted their countries and regions.

Let us first consider issues that would lead to an affirmative answer to the above questions. In the first place, most Chinese Muslims, except for the Tajik (see above), are Sunni Muslims. Thus, all but around 48 thousand of China's nearly 23 million Muslims are Sunni Muslims. This is one of the largest bodies of Sunni Muslims anywhere in the world, surpassed, say, in the Middle East only by Sunni Muslims in Turkey and in Egypt. There are many more Sunni Muslims in China than there are in Iraq.

Moreover, most of China's Muslims, save the Hui and some of the smaller groups, live in the western parts of the Xinjiang region, bordering Afghanistan, Pakistan and many of the Muslim-dominated countries of the former Russian federation. Some of the Uygur Muslims in the Xinjiang region have been and continue to be influenced and even trained by the Taliban, a Sunni Islamic Fundamentalist movement, who ruled Afghanistan from 1996 to 2001 and who to this day maintains very close ties with Osama bin Laden and his Al-Qaeda terrorist organization.

There are increasing ties and relationships with China and other Muslim countries. A cornerstone of both Sunni and Sh'ite Islam is the Hajj, i.e., the pilgrimage to Mecca. Pilgrimages of China's Muslims to Mecca have increased in the past 30 years since the first state-sponsored trip in 1976. In addition, the numbers of visitors from the Middle East to Beijing and elsewhere in China have grown dramatically. One cannot overlook this increase in the amount of economic and political activity between China and the Muslim world.

The Xinjiang area, known as the Tarim Basin, where most of China's Muslims live, was not taken over completely by the Chinese until 1760 when the Qing established full control. Indeed in Chinese, Xinjiang means the "new territory." Thus some Uygur

Muslims in Xinjiang have organized themselves into separatist organizations, which although they differ in their goals and strategies, share the common vision that Xinjiang must be returned to the Muslims (Terrell, 2003). We mentioned earlier the existence of one of these separatist organizations, the Uygur's East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM), which was declared a terrorist group by the U.S. State Department in 2002.

Another point to remember is the effect on the Muslims in Xinjiang of the establishment of independence in 1991 of the former Soviet Central Asian countries, nearby and on the border of Xinjiang, namely, Kazakhstan, Kirgizstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. For the above reasons alone, one might suspect that China's Muslims could pose a serious threat to the stability and international security of the Xinjiang region, the country of China, East Asia, and, perhaps, the world.

But there are several considerations that would argue against such a conclusion. In the first place, the growth and societal acceptance of China's Muslim population will never be sponsored, let alone encouraged, by the Chinese government. Indeed in the early years of the Communist regime, religious practices in general were discouraged because they were regarded as superstitious and a waste of time. The view of Marx that "religion is the opium of the people" guided the Communist position with regard to religion then, and still does today, although somewhat less so (Heberer, 1989). During the years of the Cultural Revolution, the Red Guards actually destroyed and ruined numerous churches and mosques and forced many Muslims, particularly Hui, to consume pork. If the Communist Party perceives a religious group to be a threat or a challenge to order and stability, it is confronted and persecuted. Witness the relationship in recent years between the Chinese government and the Falun Gong, a Chinese Buddhist-related religious group

of several million adherents that has been persecuted and suppressed by the Chinese government.

Also of interest in this regard is the seemingly continuous intervention of the Chinese government and its policies with respect to independent movements in Inner Mongolia and in Tibet. In Inner Mongolia, for example, the Chinese government just a few years ago assumed control of the Genghis Khan Mausoleum, regarded by Mongolians worldwide as a sacred space; the mausoleum was formerly controlled and operated by Mongolians. The government claimed that this move was made to boost local tourism and to open the region to the West. But the move has also been viewed as an attempt by the Chinese government to dilute ethnic nationalism.

The case of Tibet is equally striking. Although China states that Tibet has always been a part of China, most Tibetans argue otherwise. As recently as 1912, they point out, Chinese troops were expelled from Tibet and the Dalai Lama proclaimed Tibet Independence. The Chinese later regained their influence in Tibet, and in 1959 Tibetans initiated an unsuccessful uprising against China. This led to the Dalai Lama and 100,000 Tibetans escaping into exile. From that day to the present, many Tibetans hold that they have become an occupied country.

The relationships between the Chinese government and the Falun Gong, the Mongolians, and the Tibetans all illustrate the response of the government to any perceptions of religious and/or ethnic solidarity. If the Communist Party perceives a religious or ethnic group to be a threat or a challenge to order and stability, it is confronted and persecuted.

The Chinese government has also exerted control over the Muslims in Xinjiang (and the Tibetans in Tibet) by encouraging the migration of Han peoples to these areas. In the 1990s the Beijing government moved toward stimulating economic growth in Xinjiang in several ways. Agriculture was subsidized, and major investments were made in the region's infrastructure, including “building massive projects like the Tarim Desert Highway and a rail link to western Xinjiang” (Bhattacharji, 2008). One purpose of these projects was to integrate Xinjiang more closely with the rest of China. But these “growing job opportunities in Xinjiang have (also) lured a steady stream of migrant workers to the (Xinjiang) region, many of whom are ethnically Han. The Chinese government does not count the number of workers that travel to Xinjiang, but experts say the local Han population has risen from approximately 5 percent in the 1940s to approximately 40 percent today” (Bhattacharji, 2008). This is a very successful strategy for diluting the influence and importance of non-Han groups.

Regarding the relationship, specifically, between the Chinese government and Muslims, we mentioned earlier the growth in economic and commercial intercourse between China and many Muslim nations. Even if China's Muslims were able to organize themselves into a single group with the goal, say, of separating Xinjiang or the western part of Xinjiang from China, we hold that it would be very difficult, if not impossible, for such a group to be sustained. The Chinese government would surely impose on them one restriction after another.

Indeed in 2001 the Chinese government joined with Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan and formed the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). The SCO was originally known as the Shanghai Five and was

formed in 1996 to demilitarize the borders between China and the former Soviet Union and to resolve border disputes. Mongolia, Iran, Pakistan, and India hold positions in the SCO as “observers.” The SCO has gained importance in recent years in the region and has addressed issues of counterterrorism, especially since 9-11, as well as drug-trafficking. The SCO has a strong presence in the region, although it should not be viewed as a counterpoint to NATO. For instance, there are no mutual defense pledges among the member countries, unlike the situation with NATO. Daniel Kimmage, a Central Asia specialist at Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty has noted that the SCO is influential and has a presence, but “if you take NATO as your standard for organizational effectiveness, the SCO is not even close yet” (Beehner and Bhattacharji, 2008). Nonetheless, a main purpose of the SCO is to maintain strong government-to-government ties with the Muslim countries bordering and nearby China. As one reviewer of this paper remarked, such ties undermine the possibilities of foreign support from non-SCO members for independence movements in Xinjiang, a point with which we agree.

But even if China’s Muslims were living in a country with full and complete religious freedom and no government control on their activities, it would be virtually impossible for the 23 million Muslims in China to organize themselves into a single group. A major finding of this paper is that the Muslims of China are far more different from one another than they are similar. Some are socioeconomically advantaged, others disadvantaged. Most live in isolated rural locales, with very little interaction with the Han people as well as with other Muslim groups. They speak different languages and have different ancestral homes.

Moreover, even though most Chinese Muslims live in the Xinjiang region, it must be remembered that Xinjiang is huge in size, covering almost 1.7 million square kilometers, which is more than one-sixth of all of China. By comparison, the state of Texas covers 679 thousand square kilometers, making Xinjiang 2.5 times larger than Texas. Also, each of the Muslim groups in Xinjiang is mainly located in its own so-called “autonomous” county or prefecture or area where they and only they are the principal inhabitants.

The two largest Muslim groups in China, the Hui and the Uygur, comprise over 90 percent of China’s Muslims. We noted previously the existence among the Uygur of several separatist groups, all working for the removal of Xinjiang from China. Would China’s largest Muslim group, the Hui, ever join these Uygur groups in their separatist activities? To date, the Hui have neither participated in, nor been sympathetic to, these movements, and there is little evidence this will change. This points again to the broad and important sociodemographic differences between these two largest Muslim groups and, also, to the basic diversity of Islamic identity in China (Gladney, 2007). The Hui have never been enthusiastically aligned with the Uygur separatist events in Xinjiang (Dillon, 1999), and there is little evidence this will change.

However, U.S. activities and interventions in the Middle East since 9/11 have resulted in some Hui peoples starting to consider the nature of their past associations with regard to Islam and separatist issues. The head Imam of a mosque in Xi’an observed in an interview that although his religion is one of peace, a few Hui are now starting to re-think their positions. He stated the following:

Osama bin Laden is a terrorist, but you see he really has nothing to do with Islam, which preaches peace and love ... But it is Mr. Bush who is forcing those of us who otherwise didn't have a strong feeling about Osama one way or the other resolutely against the U.S. September 11 was wrong, but Mr. Bush's use of violence ... is absolutely wrong (Cheng, 2003).

A final point regarding the unlikely unification of the Hui and the Uygur is the diversity within each of these two large Muslim populations. We noted earlier that because the Hui are so widely distributed throughout China, generalizations about a "solitary" Hui group are difficult. The various communities of Hui around the country are much more different from one another than they are similar. The "enigmatic Hui" have been said to be in search of a common ethnicity (Gladney, 2004). The unification of the Hui into a single group with common societal and political goals and a single vision, say, independence from China, is most unlikely.

The Uygur as well are an extremely diverse population. Although we saw above that they are not dispersed around China and that virtually all of them live in Xinjiang, they too are characterized by extensive regional and linguistic diversity. They are divided by conflicts dealing with religion, geography, language and politics. It would almost be as unlikely for the Uygur to organize into a single political interest group with a common vision as it would be for the Hui. Recall our earlier mention of the observation made by the Uygur leader Wu'er Kaixi that "we don't ask for independence, but for respect, and an end to forced assimilation" (Schwartz, 2004)

Owing to the vast differences among the Muslim groups, as well as to differences within the Hui and within the Uyghur, and owing to the uneasy if not suppressive relationship of the Chinese government to any body, religious or otherwise, with a political agenda involving separatism, among other reasons, we conclude that it is doubtful that the Muslims of China could ever have the national and international impacts of Muslims elsewhere in the world. We do not suspect they will ever be able to organize themselves and have a multi-dimensional impact on China and the region and the world. Owing especially to their vast differences, the Muslims of China are not likely to be as influential and as far-reaching as have Muslim groups elsewhere.

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Table 1.
Ten Countries of the World with the Largest Muslim Populations, and China:
2008 and 2030

Rank	Country	Total Population	% Muslim	Muslim Population	Total Population	Muslim Population
2008		2008	2008	2008	2030	2030
1	<i>Indonesia</i>	237,512,355	86.1%	204,498,138	288,678,451	248,552,146
2	<i>Pakistan</i>	167,762,040	97.0%	162,729,179	244,144,347	236,820,017
3	<i>India</i>	1,147,995,898	13.4%	153,831,450	1,532,646,365	205,374,613
4	<i>Bangladesh</i>	153,546,901	83.0%	127,443,928	219,635,970	182,297,855
5	<i>Egypt</i>	81,713,517	90.0%	73,542,165	109,331,000	98,397,900
6	<i>Turkey</i>	71,892,807	99.8%	71,749,021	84,194,827	84,026,437
7	<i>Nigeria</i>	138,283,240	50.0%	69,141,620	211,775,517	105,887,759
8	<i>Iran</i>	65,875,223	98.0%	64,557,719	78,516,005	76,945,685
9	<i>Morocco</i>	34,343,219	98.7%	33,896,757	44,759,481	44,177,608
10	<i>Algeria</i>	33,769,667	99.0%	33,431,970	41,640,607	41,224,201
15	<i>China</i>	1,330,044,605	01.7%	22,815,882	1,461,528,089	31,495,359

Sources: 2008 data: CIA, 2008
2008 China Muslim data, authors' calculations (see text)
2030 population data: U.S. Census Bureau, 2008
2030 Muslim data: 2030 Population * 2008 % Muslim

Table 2.
Population Size of China's Predominantly Muslim Groups,
the Han, & Comparison Groups
2008, 2000, 1990 and 2030

Group	2008 (est.)	2000 (census)	1990 (census)	2030 (projected)
Hui	10,910,063	9,816,805	8,602,978	14,585,933
Uyghur	9,486,031	8,399,393	7,214,431	13,255,172
Kazakh	1,373,816	1,250,458	1,111,718	1,779,478
Dongxiang	662,611	513,805	373,872	1,333,597
Kirgiz/Kergez	178,115	160,823	141,549	235,870
Salar	120,239	104,503	87,697	176,832
Tajik	48,208	41,028	33,538	75,112
Bonan/Baoan	21,003	16,505	12,212	40,748
Ozbek/Usbek	10,892	12,370	14,502	7,677
Tatar/Tartar	4,904	4,890	4,873	4,941
Total Muslim	22,815,882	20,320,580	17,597,370	31,495,359
<u>Comparison</u>				
<u>Groups</u>				
Han	1,219,493,089	1,137,386,112	1,042,482,187	1,477,153,934
Korean	1,926,442	1,923,842	1,920,597	1,933,610
Manchu	11,425,175	10,682,262	9,821,180	13,745,543
Mongolian	6,769,546	5,813,947	4,806,849	10,287,334
Total Minorities	117,984,591	105,226,114	91,200,314	161,623,731
Total China	1,337,244,947	1,242,612,226	1,133,682,501	

Table 3. Socio-Demographic Characteristics of China's Predominantly Muslim Groups, the Han, & Other Comparison Groups, Circa-2000

Group	TFR	SRB	Age- Heaping Index	% Prof/ Leader	% Unmarr	% Rural	% Some College	Geog Diver Index	Segre- gation Index	Principal Provincial Locations	Language Family
Hui	1.5	112.4	105.8	8.5	21.2	54.7	4.1	0.912	52.7	mainly Ningxia, Gansu, Henan & Xinjiang	Diverse
Uygur	1.9	104.7	166.5	6.2	25.5	80.6	2.7	0.013	98.7		Turkic
Kazak/Kazakh	1.5	105.0	107.9	11.5	35.3	84.8	4.1	0.001	98.9		Turkic
Dongxiang	1.8	113.8	117.5	1.9	20.6	95.7	0.4	0.216	96.5		Mongolian
Kirgiz/Kergez	1.9	117.0	141.5	9.5	30.9	88.5	3.2	0.025	98.1	Xinjiang	Turkic
Salar	1.8	94.7	124.2	4.3	20.5	83.8	1.6	0.292	95.5	Gansu	Turkic
Tajik	2.0	121.9	130.5	12.2	28.9	90.8	2.3	0.073	95.6	Xinjiang	Indo- European
Bonan/Baoan	1.9	100.0	131.8	4.7	18.0	85.6	1.5	0.153	96.5		Mongolian
Ozbek/Usbek	1.5	142.9	105.7	23.8	33.0	31.8	10.6	0.044	97.1	Xinjiang	Turkic
Tatar/Tartar	1.2	150.0	107.5	30.9	34.7	51.6	14.0	0.151	93.2	Xinjiang	Turkic
Total Muslim	1.9	127.6	135.6	7.5	23.9	68.8	3.4	0.700	71.8	mainly Xinjiang	n.a.


Table 3 (CONTINUED).
Socio-Demographic Characteristics of China's Predominantly Muslim Groups, the Han, & Other Comparison Groups, Circa-2000

Group	TFR	SRB	Age- Heaping Index	% Prof/ Leader	% Unmarr	% Rural	% Some College	Geog Diver Index	Segre- gation Index	Principal Provincial Locations	Language Family
Comparison Groups											
Han	1.3	121.1	101.1	7.5	19.9	61.8	3.9	0.951	n.a.	majority in all areas, ex. Tibet & Xinjiang Jilin,	Sino- Tibetan
Korean	1.0	108.4	104.0	15.7	22.5	38.0	8.6	0.588	84.0	Heilongjiang, Liaoning Liaoning,	Korean
Manchu	1.2	109.5	102.7	9.0	20.9	64.8	4.8	0.686	79.7	Heilongjiang, Jilin	Altaic
Mongolian	1.3	109.8	102.8	10.5	25.4	67.3	5.2	0.511	79.5	Neimenggu, Xinjiang mainly	Mongolian
Total minorities	1.6	110.8	108.1	5.8	24.1	77.0	2.7	0.913	59.1	Northwest & Northeast	n.a.
China	1.3	119.9	101.7	7.4	20.3	63.1	3.8	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.

Table 4. Geographical Differentiation Index: Hui and Uygur Groups, 2000

Province	# of HUI		# of UYGUR	
	X	X ²	X	X ²
Beijing	235,837	55,619,090,569	3,129	9,790,641
Tianjin	172,357	29,706,935,449	974	948,676
Hebei	542,639	294,457,084,321	1,785	3,186,225
Shanxi	61,690	3,805,656,100	1,084	1,175,056
Inner Mongolia	209,850	44,037,022,500	1,259	1,585,081
Liaoning	264,407	69,911,061,649	2,407	5,793,649
Jilin	125,620	15,780,384,400	1,500	2,250,000
Heilongjiang	124,003	15,376,744,009	1,189	1,413,721
Shanghai	57,514	3,307,860,196	1,701	2,893,401
Jiangsu	132,582	17,577,986,724	2,213	4,897,369
Zhejiang	19,609	384,512,881	785	616,225
Anhui	337,521	113,920,425,441	1,733	3,003,289
Fujian	109,880	12,073,614,400	1,080	1,166,400
Jiangxi	9,972	99,440,784	1,142	1,304,164
Shandong	497,597	247,602,774,409	2,386	5,692,996
Henan	953,531	909,221,367,961	4,623	21,372,129
Hubei	77,759	6,046,462,081	1,457	2,122,849
Hunan	97,368	9,480,527,424	7,939	63,027,721
Guangdong	25,307	640,444,249	3,057	9,345,249
Guangxi	32,512	1,057,030,144	1,550	2,402,500
Hainan	8,372	70,090,384	354	125,316
Chongqing	10,064	101,284,096	1,194	1,425,636
Sichuan	109,960	12,091,201,600	2,158	4,656,964
Guizhou	168,734	28,471,162,756	1,149	1,320,201
Yunnan	643,238	413,755,124,644	1,161	1,347,921
Tibet	9,031	81,558,961	701	491,401
Shanxi	139,232	19,385,549,824	1,187	1,408,969
Gansu	1,184,930	1,404,059,104,900	2,131	4,541,161
Qinghai	753,378	567,578,410,884	431	185,761
Ningxia	1,862,474	3,468,809,400,676	312	97,344
Xinjiang	839,837	705,326,186,569	8,345,622	69,649,406,566,884
Total	9,816,805	8,469,835,500,985	8,399,393	69,649,566,154,899
Index Value	0.9121		0.0128	

Figure 1.
The Islamic World



Source: http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/world_maps/muslim_distribution.jpg. Map prepared with 1995 data of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency.

Figure 2. Population Pyramids and Age Heaping Charts: the Hui, Uygur and Han Nationalities, 2000

